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The task of this paper is to provide information and analysis on the legal framework
of privatisation and corporate governance in Poland and on secondary privatisation pro-
cesses in Polish privatised enterprises, i.e. changes in ownership structure which are
taking  place  after  privatisation.  The  role  of  regulatory  framework  in  secondary
privatisation  processes  is  also  shown  (besides  a  number  of  economic,  social,
gnoseological, and other factors).
5
Studies & Analyses No. 263 – Corporate Governance and Secondary Privatisation ...1. Introduction1
The task of this paper is to provide information and analysis on two topics:
– legal framework of privatisation and corporate governance in Poland;
– secondary privatisation in Polish privatised enterprises, e.g. changes in ownership
structure which are taking place after privatisation.
The role of regulatory framework in secondary privatisation processes will also be
shown (besides a number of economic, social, gnoseological, and other factors).
2. Legal framework
Polish legal system represents the Roman model, where all rules and regulations are
codified.  In  unclear  and  contradictory  cases,  supreme  legal  authorities  interpret  the
existing law, providing guidelines for courts.
Poland has all main legal acts which regulate economic activity of legal entities and
their governance, as well as functioning of capital, financial and other markets. The law
regulates both institutional building and behaviour of participants of economic relations.
In our field of interest, legal acts regulate the following spheres:
– de-etatisation and privatisation processes;
– internal structure and functioning of companies;
– external conditions for the companies, including markets and institutions with whom
companies have to interact.
Quite often specific legal acts cover more than one sphere of regulation; on the other
hand, specific elements of companies’ life are often regulated by more than one legal act.
2.1. Privatisation
The main privatisation act is the Act of August 30, 1996 on Commercialisation and
Privatisation  of  State-owned  Enterprises  which  came  into  effect  only  in  April,  1997.
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1 The author wishes to thank Barbara B³aszczyk and Richard Woodward from CASE for their helpful
comments and suggestions.Before that, the Act of July 13, 1990 on Privatisation of State-owned Enterprises had been
in force. The law distinguish two basic privatisation methods: indirect and direct.
The indirect (formerly called capital) method consists of two stages. At the first stage,
a state-owned enterprise (SOE) is commercialised, i.e., it changes its legal form and is
transformed into a company, where 100 per cent of shares belong to the Treasury (so-
called sole-shareholder company of the Treasury, Polish acronym: JSSP), and begins to
operate under provisions of the Company Code, common to all entities (except state-
owned enterprises and a limited number of companies which are governed by special
legal acts). At the second stage, the sale of the shares takes place in a number of ways:
public offering, sale to strategic investor (or combination of these two) and inclusion to
National Investment Fund program.
On  April  30,  1993,  the  Act  on  National  Investment  Funds  (NIF)  was  adopted
introducing a kind of mass privatisation program which, contrary to such programs in
other post-Communist countries, had been designed not only to transfer a significant part
of the state’s sectors assets to Polish citizens, but also to create a mechanism for actively
restructuring the companies participating in mass privatisation. NIFs received blocks of
shares of 512 companies which undergo mass privatisation, and Polish citizens received a
kind of vouchers which they could invest in the NIFs. It is worth noting, that mass
character of NIF program was only a demand side (all Polish citizens), and not on supply
side, as in other countries where mass privatisation took place. The NIF program was
supposed  to  accelerate  the  pace  of  privatisation,  at  the  same  time  providing  for
restructuring of companies, facilitated by the experience of the professional management
companies employed by the NIFs. These goals were never achieved.
The direct (formerly somewhat misleadingly called liquidation) method consists of
liquidation of a SOE in a legal sense; then, the assets of the enterprise (in totality or
divided into separated organized parts) are privatised in one of the three possible ways
(in Poland often called “paths”):
– sale;
– entering as a contribution in kind into a company established by the Treasury and a
private investor;
– leasing (employee buy-out).
The  last  path  needs  more  attention  because  it  was  very  popular  and  is  Polish
contribution into methodology of post-Communist privatisation. A SOE can enter this
path only on the request and with consent of insiders. A company (as a rule, LLC) with
participation of employees is being set up which leases the equity of formally liquidated
SOE. The company signs a leasing contract with the Treasury. The contract provisions
stipulate that upon repayment of all the capital instalments and leasing fees the assets of
the liquidated SOE will become the property of the company.
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1981 on State-owned Enterprises. It applies to SOEs in financial distress — the enterprise
is  liquidated  and  its  assets  are  sold  out.  Some  enterprises  in  agricultural  sector  are
privatised  according  to  the  principles  provided  by  the  Act  of  October  19,  1991  on
Management  of  Agriculture  Property  of  the  Treasury.  There  are  also  separate  acts
devoted to ownership transformation of certain enterprises and sectors of the economy.
Recently, a number of acts have been adopted which link privatisation with sectoral
restructuring.
All methods and paths of privatisation are equivalent (buyers pay market price or the
prise based on valuation), except the NIF program, where certificates of ownership have
been distributed among the population for a small fee.
Polish privatisation law is much diversified, if not to say eclectic. It reflects lack of
consensus of Polish politicians on the scope and ways of ownership transformation, and
more generally – on the principles of the post-Communist transformation as a whole.
The privatisation law represents a certain compromise between two main options: liberal
conceptions patterned after solutions adopted in developed Capitalist countries, and
participatory approach originating from the Polish labour self-management movement
and tending towards a kind of “third road” of development through building of the so-
called  “social  market  economy.”  Some  provisions  of  the  law  were  also  intended  to
overcome the assumed resistance of insiders.
The privatisation law regulates not only the privatisation process itself, but also in
some  cases  the  initial  corporate  governance  structure,  including  initial  ownership
distribution and composition of corporate governance bodies. The scope and character
of the impact of the regulations depends on the privatisation method applied (see also the
next section). However, the common feature is preferences for insiders, both in starting
privatisation,  and  in  distribution  of  shares.  Before  the  privatisation  act  of  1996  was
adopted, all privatisation deals had been initiated or had needed to be approved by the
governing bodies of SOEs. In 1997, such a requirement was lifted.
According to the 1990 Act, in indirect (capital) privatisation employees had a right to
acquire 10 per cent of shares at reduced price; these preferences were increased by the
1996 Act by granting a right to insiders to acquire 15 per cent of shares for free. Another
15 per cent can be received for free by farmers and fishermen if they were suppliers of
the former SOE (with restrictions regarding the volume of supplies). Besides, the new
Act lifted the requirement that JSSPs, as a transitional entity, should be privatised within
2 years after commercialisation. It introduced a legal background for impeding ownership
transformation in this group of companies. 
Until 1997, the leasing path of direct privatisation preferred extremely insiderised
patterns of ownership structure: the new company should have been founded by the
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Ministry of Ownership Transformation). The Act of 1996 imposes certain limits on the
use of direct privatisation paths and the role of insiders in ownership transformation.
Limits have been set on the size of enterprises (in terms of employment level, assets and
turnover); outsiders gained a right to take initiative in privatisation without prior consent
of insiders; in leasing path, at least 20 per cent of shares in the new company must be in
the hands of outsiders; possibilities of participation of legal persons have been increased.
2.2. Corporate governance structures within an enterprise
The main act which regulates corporate governance relations at a company level is
the Company Code of September 15, 2000 (enacted on January 1, 2001). It replaces the
Commercial Code of June 27, 1934.
In Poland, the continental model of corporate governance structure is developing.
This model adopts the principle of strict separation between the management function
and the ownership control function, as distinct from the Anglo-Saxon model in which
these functions are to a large extent combined. The adoption of the continental model as
the  target,  assuring  a  strict  owner  control  over  the  company’s  executive  bodies  is
particularly important, as in Poland, as well as in other post-communist countries, the
influence of external control (in the form of commodity, financial, take-over and other
markets)  is  in  many  cases  still  not  sufficiently  effective.  In  such  conditions,  efficient
functioning of the internal supervision assumes fundamental importance. Moreover, the
continental model assumes the significant role of a strategic investor, who, especially
foreign one, is able to bring to a company not only capital, but also a new culture of
management, of company’s behaviour towards its environment, new technology etc.
which are badly needed in a post-Communist country.
On  a  company  level,  it  means  two-tier  system  with  separate  executive  and
supervisory boards. Supervisory boards are compulsory in all JSCs and large LLCs. As a
rule, supervisory board members are elected at the shareholders’ meeting (group voting
is possible). In most cases, supervisory board appoints the members of the executive
board (in general, the supervisory board’s position vis-à-vis executive board has been
strengthened in the new Code). Formally, supervisory board has a wide range of powers,
especially controlling ones, as a safeguard against opportunism of managers. It supervises
all spheres of the company’s functioning and has a right to study all documentation and
to receive all necessary information not only from executive board members, but also
from every employee in the company. Supervisory board’s powers can be fine-tuned in
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however, widespread weak role of this body in the corporate governance system is
reported in the surveys, executive boards often being the most influential body (this
situation  is  jokingly  called  “Vistula  model”  of  corporate  governance,2 as  opposed  to
continental and Anglo-Saxon models). 
In most cases, Polish legislation does not take into account concern of stakeholders
in corporate governance structures. For example, there is no requirement to include
representatives of stakeholders (e.g., employees) into the supervisory board. However,
the surveys show that in many privatised companies stakeholders (first of all managers
and  employees)  a  represented  in  this  body  as  a  part  of  personnel  policy  of  core
shareholders. 
The peculiarity of the Polish legal system is that the main vehicle for representation
of stakeholder interests is privatisation legislation, rather than regulations affecting the
enterprise sector in general. Thus, there are fundamental differences in the corporate
governance regime depending on whether an enterprise originated in the state sector or
the de novo private sector – a situation which is, to our knowledge, not found in any other
European  country.  Apart  from  above-mentioned  insider-dependent  originating  of
privatisation cases and establishing preferences for insiders and some suppliers in buying
shares,  privatisation  legislation  introduces  legal  support  for  stakeholder  interests  in
corporate governance bodies. In both cases theses are insiders’ interests in privatised
enterprises:
– in the course of indirect privatisation, when employees of the former SOE and some
categories of suppliers are granted an option for free shares, and employees have a
right to appoint 40 per cent of members of the supervisory board as long as the
Treasury remains the sole shareholder;
– in  the  companies  that  have  been  privatised  through  commercialisation  and  are
employing more than 500 persons, employees elect one member of the Executive
Board. This provision is very unclear. For example, it is not known for what period
after privatisation employees have such a right.
There  are  also  provisions  dealing  with  conflict  of  interests  of  members  of  the
executive board, supervisory board, and shareholders. It covers personal capital links
with other firms and responsibility towards the company. At the same time, there is no
legal requirement to include independent members in supervisory boards, although such
a provision can be found in charter of a few Polish companies. However, the Warsaw
Stock Exchange has recently introduced a requirement for all listed companies to include
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2 The term was coined by Krzysztof Lis, Chairman of the Polish Privatisation Agency at the beginning of
transformation.before the end of 2004 at least 50 per cent of independent members to their Supervisory
Boards (see below).
There  is  another  sphere  where  conflict  of  interests  is  not  properly  managed.
Although auditor has to be independent from the audited company (do not possess
shares, not to be the company’s attorney, etc.), there is no legal prohibition for an auditor
to be simultaneously a consultant for the same firm. Moreover, if such an auditor provides
bookkeeping for a firm, he still can perform audit (except for those part of financial
documents  which  has  been  prepared  by  himself).  Lack  of  proper  regulations  in  this
sphere is potentially very dangerous, which is confirmed by latest bookkeeping scandals
in the USA. 
The  Commercial  Code  also  contains  a  system  of  safeguards  against  minority
shareholders  abuse.  Shareholder  has  a  right  to  appeal  against  a  decision  of  the
shareholder’s meeting if such a decision violates the company charter, good practices or
the company’s concern. By the way, such a right belongs to executive and supervisory
boards’ members as well. Minority shareholders have extended rights for group voting.
There are three types of preferential shares:
– privileged shares, giving their holders greater than one and no more than 2 voices per
share (till the end of 2004, the Treasury can have up to 5 voices per share);
– golden share;
– non-voting share (since 2001).
A voting cap can be introduced for shareholders that possess more than 20 per cent of
voices. On the other hand, most important decisions should be approved by qualified majority
of voices on the shareholders’ meeting (2/3 to 3/4). There are provisions against collusion of
shareholders. Every member of the supervisory board and a shareholder who possess at least
10 per cent of shares has a right to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting.
The Act of January 21, 1997 on Public Securities Trading, which regulates only publicly
listed companies, grants a shareholder or a group of shareholders that possess at least 5
per cent of votes a right to appoint a special controller whose task is to investigate a
concrete problem of the company’s functioning. The same act imposes on a strategic
investor an obligation of mandatory bid if he possesses more than 50 per cent of votes.
Such a bid must be also announced when someone is going to buy more than 10 per cent
of shares. There is a system of safeguards which is intended to ensure proper prices for
sellers of shares. In publicly listed companies, an investor must obtain a permission of The
Securities and Exchange Commission to pass a threshold of 25 per cent, 33 per cent, and
50 per cent of voices. All blocks of shares which give their owners at least 5 per cent of
voices must be registered.
One  of  the  most  important  means  of  preserving  shareholders  rights  vis-à-vis
managers and large shareholders are information and disclosure requirements. The rights
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any  shareholder  to  ask  the  executive  board  for  information  that  is  necessary  for
evaluation of topics discussed at the shareholders’ meeting. According to the Act of
September  29,  1994  on  Accounting,  financial  statements  of  companies  must  include
information on remuneration of top managers and supervisory board members, as well
as on any loan they may receive from the company. Information must be provided about
capital groups (other companies in which the company possess at least 20 per cent of
shares). The Act on Public Securities Trading provides publicly listed companies with
additional requirements regarding informational transparency. These companies have to
publish  all  information  which  may  influence  the  prise  of  shares.  There  are  special
disclosure provisions devoted to selling and buying shares by major shareholders.
On the other hand, there are provisions of the Polish law which are intended to
withstand the misuse of the above-mentioned safeguards. When a shareholder starts a
legal  action  against  a  decision  of  the  shareholders’  meeting,  this  does  not  stops  its
execution; in case if the court decides that the protest is groundless, the suer has to pay
a penalty up to ten times of the cost of the court examination. A company has a right to
deny a shareholder an access to some data if it would cause damage to the company.
In practice, in Poland there are a lot of cases both of abuse majority and minority
rights, as well as of managers’ opportunism. There are three main causes which make
those violations possible:
– The problems of corporate governance formation in Poland. As a result of consensual
privatisation,  dispersed  and  highly  insiderised  patterns  of  ownership  structure  often
emerged  with  strong  positions  of  managers  and  to  some  extent  non-managerial
employees.  That  hampers  the  effective  control  of  shareholders  over  managers  and
outsiders over insiders (given generally still weak outsider investorship in Poland). This
provides to preservation of “legacy of Socialism” in former state-owned enterprises with
very strong position of managers (most of them being directors before privatisation). On
the  other  hand,  if  a  company  is  sold  to  outsiders,  highly  concentrated  pattern  of
ownership structure emerges which makes possible minority abuses. High role of the
Treasury in many firms which are undergoing indirect privatisation is also important.
– The inadequate law. First, the law that describes corporate governance structures in
companies is not instructive enough, too often giving general idea and principles rather
than concrete solutions. Second, the system of rights and safeguards that regulates
corporate  governance  relations  within  companies  is  not  extremely  efficient.  For
example, minority interests can be (and sometimes are) abused with the help of anti-
collusion provisions. Disclosure requirements do not cover all cases of gaining control
over a firm with the help of affiliated and subordinated companies. There are situations
when mandatory bids can be avoided without breaking the law. Prevention of hostile
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meetings are widespread. Managers have legal possibilities of profits stripping and
tunnelling. Disclosure provisions are often regarded as very complicated and there is
a widespread opinion among managers, that some of them are impracticable. Third,
legal acts sometimes contradict each other and overlap (first of all, Company Code,
Act on Public Securities Trading, and Act on Commercialisation and Privatisation of
State-owned Enterprises).
– Poor enforcement of the law. Nor the courts, neither the prosecutors have sufficient
capacities  or  skills  to  cope  with  cases  of  illegal  actions  in  companies.  Within  the
Warsaw Territorial Public Prosecutor’s Office a department of capital market offences
has been established, but positive results are still hard to be seen. Fiscal administration
is incapable to cope with transfer pricing.
In recent years, attempts have been made to strengthen corporate governance by
elaborating and introducing best practices of corporate governance. The main idea behind
this approach was that because legal regulations themselves are incapable of dealing with
all the problems of corporate governance, a set of principles should be prepared which
would both serve as instruction on how to behave correctly and as a form of moral
pressure on companies to introduce these principles. In Poland, two teams prepared their
own best practices codes: the Polish Corporate Governance Forum affiliated with the
Gdañsk Institute for Market Economics, and Corporate Governance Forum affiliated with
the Institute for Business Development. The idea of the first project was rather to explain
the idea and main principles of proper corporate governance practice, whereas the second
one was aimed more at giving concrete suggestions how corporate governance bodies
within a company should behave, what decisions they are to make, etc. 
In  2002,  the  Warsaw  Stock  Exchange  adopted  a  Best  Practices  Code  for  listed
companies, based on the second project, but also using some ideas from the first one. As
a result, the Code became less concrete and instructive, but at the same time tried to
show some general idea of good corporate behavior. The Code includes a few concrete
provisions absent in Polish company law:
– at least 50 per cent of supervisory board members should be independent (they are
granted extended rights);
– management remuneration must be disclosed in detail;
– decisions of the general assembly of shareholders must be formulated in a way which
makes it possible to sue them;
– auditors must be changed at least every five years;
– the special controller must be fully independent;
– when a company buys back its own shares, all shareholders must have equal rights to
sell their shares.
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in practice. Beginning July 1, 2003, all listed companies must report whether they comply
with the provisions of the Code, and if not, what specific provisions are not introduced and
why. But in fact even the above mentioned concrete provisions will hardly be enforced in a
large number of companies, because there is no effective punishment for not introducing
those measures into companies’ charters and everyday behavior. At most, the WSE can
publish  a  list  of  companies  which  do  not  comply  with  the  best  practices  regulations.
Therefore, this document is rather a kind of moral obligation imposed on companies, than
a strict regulation. The first three months of enforcement of this new regulation showed
that most companies at least verbally declared their willingness to play “the best practices
game”: only 18 out of 205 listed companies declared that they hadn’t introduced the best
practices and did not intend to do so in future. At the same time, among the rest of the
companies, none declared compliance to every provision of the Code. The most common
problem was lack of independent members on the supervisory boards.
2.3. External aspects of corporate governance
2.3.1. Capital market
In Poland, there are several quite different segments of capital market. 
Institutionalised market is strictly regulated by the Act on Public Securities Trading
and represented by the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). There is popular opinion, that in
terms of organization and enforcement, the WSE is the best stock exchange in post-
Communist countries. Act on Public Securities Trading imposes very strict disclosure and
transparency  regulations  on  entries  on  organized  securities  market  and  on  listed
companies. Companies have to provide information on ownership structure, names of
shareholders which have voting rights, shareholders which possess at least 5 per cent of
votes; all information which can influence the price of shares; quarterly, semi-annual and
annual reports with financial statement, etc. All these data are to be published. Violation
of the law can be punished by a fine up to 1 million zlotys or by withdrawing the company
from the WSE. The organized securities market and behaviour of its players is supervised
by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
However, the list of flaws in Polish organized securities market is rather long.
This market is highly concentrated: at the end of 2001, 14 per cent of companies
listed represented 85 per cent of the whole capitalisation at the WSE3. Large enterprises
14
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first of all institutional investors; small individual investors are numerous, but very weak;
their share on the stock market is steadily declining (from 50 per cent of total turnover
of shares in 2000 to 28 per cent in the first half of 2003). Therefore the concern of small
individual investors maybe is not abused, but simply ignored.
The WSE was established mainly to serve initial public offerings in the course of
indirect privatisation. It is still dominated by privatised sector: 61 per cent companies
listed are former state-owned enterprises. The largest ones are those which have been
privatised  by  indirect  method  through  initial  public  offering  (77  per  cent  of  total
capitalisation of the WSE). Domination of privatised enterprises becomes a barrier for
further development of the WSE, because the main task of indirect privatisation is to find
strategic  investors  for  SOEe,  and  such  investors  are  not  interested  in  keeping  the
companies public. In many cases, they are forced to do it by the provisions of privatisation
contracts;  very  often  only  small  part  of  shares  is  on  the  market.  Slowing  pace  of
privatisation contributes to further fall on the supply side.
The situation additionally complicates, because new players are entering the market
which produce additional demand (e.g., pension funds). The WSE never gained equilibrium
of demand and supply. During the first years of its existence, there was huge supply of
shares of larges privatised companies. Now, the situation is the other way round.
As a result, the WSE represents very small market which has a tendency to shrink.
Overall capitalisation of the WSE is rather low (15 per cent GDP) and shows falling trend.
Now the turnover of the WSE on the cash market is shrinking at a pace of over 20 per
cent a year and by the end of 2002 amounted to 71.7 billion zlotys. There are virtually no
new entries, and some companies are exiting the market. The total number of companies
listed is falling (from 230 by the end of 2001 to 216 by the end of 2002).
The  WSE  does  not  properly  perform  two  basic  functions  of  a  stock  exchange:
valuation and a source of capital for private sector. The irony is that the Treasury is the
largest beneficiary of capital inflow through the WSE.
The securities issued by companies which do not meet tough regulations of the WSE,
do not want to be listed or cannot be listed (e.g., shares of LLCs) are bought and sold on
“unregulated” segment of securities market, which is still regulated by the law, although
not so strict as in the case of publicly listed companies. Banks and brokerage houses made
an attempt to organize somewhat this segment of market by introducing the over-the
counter market (known by its Polish abbreviation CTO), but this initiative proved to be
incapable to gain support from companies which participate in the securities market.
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3 In this section, the WSE official data has been used (www.gpw.pl).2.3.2. Investment Funds
According to Polish law (Act of August 28, 1997 on Investment Funds and other acts),
there are 5 main types of investment funds: general opened and closed funds, specialised
opened and closed funds, and mixed funds. Capital of the funds is accumulated as a result
of emission of vouchers or investment certificates.
The  investment  funds  are  under  strict  control  of  the  law  and  the  Securities  and
Exchange  Commission.  Functioning  of  open  funds  which  buy  shares  of  companies  is
restricted most. Shares of one company cannot constitute more than 5 per cent of the
fund’s portfolio (the limit can be increased up to 10 per cent if such investments amount
to less than 40 per cent of the whole portfolio). Funds cannot buy more than 10 per cent
of voting shares in a company. In fact, Polish law prevents institutional investors from
becoming active core investors, limiting their role to passive players on securities markets.
In mid-2002, there were about 130 investments funds. Their net assets amounted to
14.9 billion zlotys.
Two specific groups of investment funds are of special interest from the point of view
of privatisation and post-privatisation processes.
The first group are National Investment Funds (NIF), which were mentioned in the
previous section of the paper. They are a part of mass privatisation program (Law of April
30, 1994 on National Investment Funds and their Privatisation). NIFs have restructured
their portfolios and sold a lot of companies. 36 companies from the NIF program entered
the WSE. Some NIFs changed the character of activity and are engaging themselves in
venture capital and private equity investments. By the end of 2001, NIFs possessed more
than 5 per cent shares in 15 listed companies.
The second group are pension funds which emerged in the course of pension reform
that started in 1999. There are strict regulations of the pension funds investment activities
(Act of August 28, 1997 on Set-up and Functioning of Pension Funds and other acts). They
can  invest  only  in  “safe”  securities,  i.e.  they  can  buy  shares  of  only  publicly  listed
companies (no more than 40 per cent of pension funds’ portfolio); a fund cannot have
more than 5 per cent of shares of one company, ant shares of one company cannot
amount to more than 5 per cent of the fund’s portfolio. Functioning of pension funds is
supervised by the Insurance and Pension Funds Supervision Commission.
Despite the restrictions, a strong group of 17 funds have formed whose investments
on the WSE amount to 6 per cent of its capitalization. Pension funds have a steady inflow
of  mandatory  pension  payments.  Therefore,  they  will  strengthen  their  position  on
securities markets, including the WSE. On the other hand, the shallow organized market
is not able to satisfy the growing demand on securities created by the pension funds.
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Given the fact that the stock market in Poland is very weak in supplying companies
with capital, bank credit is still the most important source of external financial resources.
However, despite lack of legal restrictions, as a rule banks limit their engagement in
companies  to  lending  them  money  and  rather  are  not  interested  in  participation  in
companies’  equity  (see  the  next  section).  Only  one  bank  tried  to  actively  acquire
property (BRE Bank).
Banks are not interested in debt-to-equity swaps, which can be performed under
provisions of the Act on Commercialisation and Privatisation (as a separate track of
commercialisation of SOEs – there were only 14 such chases) and the Act of March 4,
1993 on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks. One of the goals of the latter
act (apart from the main goal of overcoming the bad enterprises’ debts crisis and saving
the Polish banking system), was to encourage banks’ involvement in restructuring and
privatisation of state-owned enterprises. While the goal of saving the banking system has
been achieved, in most cases banks proved to be incapable and/or not interested in more
active involvement in governance of enterprises.
The role of banks in corporate governance structures and organization is very weak.
Banks do not perform a role of a proxy in execution of corporate rights (except bank
brokerage houses which perform asset management services; however, they are formally
independent from the banks). The quality of the corporate governance control of the
banks  over  the  companies  is  often  questionable,  the  spectacular  bankruptcy  of  the
Szczecin Shipyard being a good example. 
Another reason of small role of banks in corporate control is underdeveloped bank
credit market, especially in the SME sector. As a rule, banks are very cautious in lending
money to enterprises, especially small and medium-sized, regarding such activity as more
risky than other available investment instruments (e.g., Treasury bonds). On the other
hand, enterprises use retained earnings and trade credit as their basic sources of financing,
often trying to avoid bank credit because of the high costs of this type of financing.
2.3.4. Insurance companies
On Polish insurance market, tens of companies are operating. They can invest in
publicly traded securities and investment certificates. Their value must not exceed 40 per
cent of reserve funds of an insurance company. In practice, most insurance companies do
not  actively  invest  at  securities  market.  On  average,  in  2001  shares  and  investment
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there are companies that actively play on the securities market, i.e., state-owned PZU
and PZU ¯ycie. The latter often uses investment funds as intermediaries.
2.3.5. Bankruptcies
There are two methods of property redistribution of insolvent enterprises. One is
liquidation under provisions of art. 19 of the Act on State-owned Enterprises (mentioned
in the previous section). It is an administrative procedure which can be applied to state-
owned enterprises. By the end of the first quarter 2003, out of 1802 such cases started,
918 have been completed (Ministry of the Treasury 2003).
Judicial bankruptcy procedures are regulated by the pre-war Act of October 24, 1934
on Bankruptcy (several times heavily amended). There are about 3000 bankruptcy cases
started  every  year;  however,  their  role  in  property  redistribution  could  be  more
significant  if  the  concern  of  creditors  is  properly  protected.  Very  often  companies
proclaim bankruptcy too late, when assets have already been withdrawn; courts often
dismiss bankruptcy cases, because the value of assets is not enough even to cover the
costs of court examination. 
3. Changes in ownership structure
3.1. Initial conditions for secondary privatisation
The heterogeneous character of Polish privatisation (many different methods and
“paths,”  consensual  character  of  most  privatisation  cases)  led  to  heterogeneity  of
emerging types of ownership structure and patterns of further property redistribution
(often called “secondary privatisation”). 
Indirect (capital) privatisation included mostly large SOEs, in relatively good economic
and financial condition, and in sectors whose privatisation was politically controversial. In
the “mainstream” indirect privatisation, strategic investors were preferred; minority blocks
of shares were distributed among employees and other small shareholders. However, one
should remember, that a significant number of enterprises (475 at the end of 2001) failed
to  privatise  after  commercialisation  and  the  Treasury  remains  their  sole  shareholder
(comparing with 309 companies where indirect privatisation has been completed). 
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main blocks of shares were distributed among 15 investment funds (one, the so-called
leading fund, received 33 per cent of shares, others received 1,93 per cent each); the
Treasury  was  the  second  largest  shareholder,  keeping  25  per  cent  of  shares,  and
employees received the remaining 15 per cent.
Indirect privatisation as a whole included mostly small and medium-sized enterprises,
even before maximum size of SOEs was imposed in 1997. There is also a significant
differentiation within the direct method of privatisation:
– Direct sale mostly covered rather small firms which could be easily sold to a new
owner. At the same time, a modification of this “path,” called “the fast track,” covered
enterprises in economic distress, and the buyer had to pay off the firm’s debts. In both
cases, as a rule, an enterprise was sold to one person, so concentrated patterns of
ownership were preferred.
– On the contribution in kind “path,” the were no clear preferences for a specific type
of enterprise; however, the importance of this path is very small (only 9.7 per cent of
all direct privatisation cases).
– For leasing (the so-called employee buy-outs) a specific category of SOEs suited more:
rather small (in order to be affordable for employees), and in rather good economic
and financial condition (in order to produce enough profit to pay leasing fees and do
not need immediate investments). Legal requirements predestined highly insiderised
and to a large extent dispersed ownership structure.
Another  group  of  factors  which  constitute  the  initial  conditions  for  secondary
privatisation  is  a  kind  of  “legacy”  after  a  state-owned  enterprise:  its  organisational
structure, structures of power and influence, mentality of main insider actors. Further
changes  in  ownership  structure  (pace  and  character)  to  a  large  extend  depend  on
whether those “legacy” factors are surmounted during or after privatisation.
3.2. Evolution of ownership structure
In Poland, there were a lot of studies and surveys devoted to ownership structure of
privatised enterprises. The contribution of at least three research teams, which studied
national samples of enterprises, should be mentioned:
– A team of the Gdañsk Institute for Market Economics (IBnGR) which studies the
problems  of  corporate  governance  in  publicly  listed  firms.  In  the  first  half  of  the
nineties, they also studied impact of privatisation on enterprises, including ownership
issues.
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centres in Great Britain, Czech Republic and other countries. Two of them should be
mentioned in the first place: the project devoted to secondary privatisation in Poland,
Slovenia, and Czech Republic (special attention was paid to employee buyouts and NIF
program),  and  the  project  on  corporate  governance  restructuring  in  Poland  and
Hungary (largest privatised enterprises).
– Studies performed through the whole nineties by the research team of the Institute of
Political  Studies,  Polish  Academy  of  Sciences  on  direct  privatisation,  foreign
investments in privatisation and, recently, a comparative study of direct privatisation,
foreign investments and the JSSP sector.
None of the teams have performed a survey which covered the whole sector of
privatised enterprises in Poland. In each research project, field of study, as well as key for
choosing companies to be surveyed were different. As a rule, those studies were made
once and never repeated; they reported a situation for a certain moment, or at least
period  of  time  if  it  had  been  possible  to  build  time  series  of  data;  some  data  are
overlapping. Therefore data gathered by the research teams are fragmented and not fully
comparable.
Fortunately,  because  of  initial  diversification  and  specific  regulations  concerning
property  redistribution  after  privatisation,  several  patterns  of  ownership  structure
evolution, as well as the whole corporate governance system, are evolving. Therefore,
analysing ownership structure of Polish privatised enterprises, we should not use mean
values  for  the  whole  population,  because  it  will  conceal  very  important  differences
between various groups of companies.
The results of most recent surveys are presented below in groups according to
privatisation methods and types of companies under review.
3.2.1. Direct (capital) privatisation
A. The National Investment Funds Program
In the framework of the Phare ACE project “Secondary Privatisation: The Evolution of
Ownership Structure of Privatised Companies” (coordinated by Barbara B³aszczyk, CASE
Foundation), evolution of ownership structure of both 15 the NIFs themselves and 512
enterprises included in mass privatisation program, have been studied (B³aszczyk et al. 2001).
After the program started, a significant evolution of ownership structure has taken
place in enterprises included in the NIF program. There was a strong tendency towards
concentration of ownership in fewer hands (C1=48.3 in 2000) and at the same time a
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companies (48 per cent) have been transferred to strategic investors, with 52 of them
sold to foreign investors (10 per cent of the whole population). 80 companies (15 per
cent) went bankrupt or have entered bankruptcy or liquidation processes. 36 companies
(7 per cent) are quoted on the WSE.
The majority of companies have come out of NIF control and have found dominant
owners. Other companies and individuals have emerged as major dominant shareholders.
On average, most strategic investors gained an absolute control (more than 50 per cent)
of the firms’ equity (see Table 1).
It is not clear, what are the determinants of ownership concentration. Firm specific
factors  do  not  always  appear  significant.  An  attempt  to  find  a  correlation  between
ownership and performance has been made. It was assumed, that ownership structure is
endogenous. The results, however, are not unambiguous. If further analysis does not
confirm  that  ownership  and  performance  are  both  determined  by  unobserved  fixed
effects,  the  authors  of  the  study  promised  to  look  for  the  impact  of  ownership  on
performance.
Changes in ownership stricture of the National Investment Funds have also been
studied. Share of the Treasury and of small investors (institutional and individual) was
steadily decreasing (from 25 per cent and 85 per cent respectively at the beginning of the
program to 13 per cent and 41 per cent at the beginning of 2001). At the same time, the
share of institutional and large investors has been rising. By January, 2001 institutional
investors had 46 per cent of the shares of NIFs, and foreign investors 26 per cent. At that
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Table 1. The evolution of ownership structure in NIF companies
L La ar rg ge es st t s sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er r g gr ro ou up p 
( (m mo or re e t th ha an n 1 15 5 p pe er r c ce en nt t o of f e eq qu ui it ty y) ) 
N Nu um mb be er r o of f f fi ir rm ms s  
i in n 2 20 00 00 0 
E Eq qu ui it ty y h ho ol ld di in ng gs s  
i in n  p pe er r c ce en nt t, , m me ea an n 
Domestic investors  193  58.6 
of which:     
employees  13  55.4 
individuals  48  55.0 
other firms  116  60.6 
financial institutions  10  32.8 
other NIF  6  35.4 
Foreign investors
a  52  73.7 
Others:     
firms listed on the WSE
b  36   
liquidation  12   
bankruptcy  68   
a For the firms with foreign investor the 15 per cent threshold is not imposed.
b 25 of these companies is included in the group with “domestic investors” as the main shareholder.
Source: Grosfeld and Hashi (2001).time, Polish large investors’ involvement was more modest (13.5 per cent). All observed
trends reflected progressing ownership concentration. Over a period from June 1998 to
December 2000, the C1 index increased from 5 per cent to 24 per cent and C3 index
increased from 7 per cent to 42 per cent. Now, all NIFs achieved a concentration level
and ownership structure ensuring full and stable control of the funds.
However,  an  impact  of  NIFs  on  their  portfolio  companies  has  been  assessed  as
unsatisfactory. During the whole period, economic and financial performance of the NIF
companies has been deteriorating, and in 1999 this group of Polish enterprises had the
worst profitability among other groups of companies. It is clear, that the capital and/or
strategies  of  other  investors  were  more  effective  in  generating  improvements  in
companies than were the NIFs.
B. Largest privatised enterprises
In the framework of the Phare ACE project “Corporate Governance, Relational
Investors,  Strategic  Restructuring  and  Performance  in  Hungary  and  Poland”
(coordinated  by  Tomasz  Mickiewicz,  SSEES  UCL),  a  survey  of  84  Polish  privatised
industrial companies (the share of the state is less than 50 per cent), sampled from a list
of the 500 largest firms (in the terms of sales), has been performed. The collected data
cover the period from 1998 till the end of 2000. All enterprises have been privatised
through the direct method.
Ownership structure of this group of companies is highly concentrated (and the
concentration level is still growing) and insiders’ participation is very limited, unlike in
privatised SMEs and contrary to pro-insider provisions of Polish privatisation law.
In  almost  all  companies  under  review,  deep  changes  in  corporate  governance
structures have been introduced, and the “legacy” of state-owned past has already been
overcome. Thus, the processes of post-communist corporate governance transformation
seem to be completed. However, changes in corporate control mechanisms appear to be
conditional on the characteristics of the controlling shareholders group.
There are four such groups:
– foreign investors;
– domestic institutional shareholders;
– domestic private individuals not working in the companies;
– insiders.
Companies with highest levels of ownership concentration, especially dominated by
foreign  investors,  have  more  coherent  corporate  governance  structures.  In  the
companies with lowest levels of ownership concentration, the shareholders’ majority is
often rather formal and does not ensure a real control over the company.
22
Studies & Analyses No. 263 – P . KozarzewskiAt the same time, no evidence was found that the level of ownership concentration
directly affects companies’ performance. The concentration indicator proves to be of
secondary importance, conversely the type of dominating owner shows a much stronger
correlation with performance of the firms. However, there is no sufficient proof that the
type of dominating owner is the sole or the most important factor which affects the
performance  of  the  companies.  In  many  cases,  ownership  structure  could  have  an
endogenous character, because a type of buyer of state property to a great extent was
determined by companies’ characteristics. At the same time, there is evidence that some
types of ownership structures can have an exogenous character, first of all ownership
concentrated in the hands of foreign investors (Kozarzewski 2002).
C. Enterprises privatised with participation of foreign investor
In  the  framework  of  the  project  “Privatisation  in  Poland  1990-2002:  Progress,
Conflicts,  Dysfunction”  financed  by  the  State  Committee  for  Scientific  Research
(coordinated by Maria Jarosz, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences), a
comparative study of three groups of enterprises have been carried out: companies sold
to a foreign investor, sole-shareholder companies of the Treasury (JSSPs), and employee
buy-outs (Jarosz 2003). In the course of the survey at the enterprises, data for 1998-2000
and the moment of privatisation has been gathered, as well as opinions of top managers
on functioning of their firms.
In the privatised companies with foreign participation, the highest possible level of
ownership concentration has apparently been reached. There is a dominating investor
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Table  2.  Ownership  structure  and  ownership  concentration  of  largest  industrial
companies (per cent, simple averages)
  1 19 99 98 8  1 19 99 99 9  2 20 00 00 0 
Shareholder type       
top managers of the company  3.4  2.7  4.4 
other employees of the company  9.3  8.0  7.0 
former employees and managers  2.7  3.4  2.5 
other external private individuals  19.2  18.8  17.7 
the Treasury   8.8  8.3  7.9 
domestic industrial companies  9.2  8.8  10.5 
investment funds  11.7  11.7  8.1 
banks  2.9  2.4  3.0 
foreign investors / companies  19.8  22.3  26.1 
other   6.4  7.2  7.9 
Ownership concentration       
one largest shareholder  54.2  55.7  59.1 
five largest shareholders  78.2  78.7  80.7 
Source: Kozarzewski (2002).(more than 50 per cent of shares) in 80 per cent of such firms, and in the rest of firms
there is at least one strategic investor (20 per cent of shares or more). The ownership
structure has stabilised: during 1998-2000, no significant changes were seen. Interesting
feature of corporate governance policy in foreign dominated companies is introducing
incentives for insiders, first of all managers, in the form of small blocks of shares and/or
seats  on  the  supervisory  board.  Corporate  governance  structures  in  most  of  these
companies  are  transparent  with  clear  division  of  powers  among  executive  board,
supervisory  board,  and  shareholders’  meeting,  with  broad  participation  of  insiders,
especially elites of the former SOE. At the same time, foreign investor keeps tight and
efficient control over the firm.
D. Sole-shareholder companies of the Treasury (JSSPs)
Studied  in  the  framework  of  the  same  project,  JSSPs  proved  to  be  the  most
dysfunctional group of companies included in the privatisation process. Lack of progress
in privatisation of these firms leads to lack of formation of efficient corporate governance
structures  and  relations.  The  existing  structures  are  characterised  by  high  level  of
managers’ and trade unions’ influence and very weak role of the Treasury as the sole
owner of the company. Besides, in many JSSP the spheres of influence of main actors has
not stabilised which gives ground for perpetual conflicts. There is nothing to be said about
ownership  structure  dynamics  in  JSSPs  under  review:  during  the  whole  period,  it
remained unchanged.
E. Listed companies
A study of 210 listed non-financial companies (190 listed on the WSE  and 20 on a free
market)  has  been  performed  at  the  Gdañsk  Institute  for  Market  Economics  in  the
framework of the project “Ownership and Control of Polish Corporations” (financed by
the  State  Committee  for  Scientific  Research  and  the  CIPE,  coordinated  by  Piotr
Tamowicz) (Tamowicz and Dzier¿anowski 2001a). The data reflects the situation of the
companies  in  November,  2000.  Ownership  structure  was  measured  by  voices  at
shareholders’ meeting. Both concentration indexes and overall ownership structure have
been analysed. Ownership concentration of the companies under review proved to be
high  and  similar  to  that  of  in  many  other  countries  of  continental  Europe.  Other
companies and physical persons were the largest shareholder groups (they possessed
39.4 per cent and 30.8 per cent of all largest blocks of shares). Foreign investors had the
largest share in companies’ equity, the Treasury and state-owned companies being the
second largest group of owners (see Table 3).
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was measured as difference between number of shares and number of voices possessed
by various types of shareholders.4 In the case of the largest blocks of shares, the overall
difference was not high (median for control was 39.5 per cent and median for ownership
was 37.2 per cent). However, in some companies such a difference was very high (in one
case, a person which possessed only 47.5 per cent of shares had 81.0 per cent of voices).
Two main methods of increasing control over the number of shares were used: privileged
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Table 3. Share of owner groups in publicly listed companies' capitalisation (per cent)
S Sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er r c ca at te eg go or ry y 
N No on n- 
f fi in na an nc ci ia al l  
c co om mp pa an ni ie es s 
T TP P S SA A  
( (t te el le ec co om m) ) 
B Ba an nk ks s 
I In ns su ur ra an nc ce e 
c co om mp pa an ni ie es s 
N NI IF Fs s  T To ot ta al l 
Foreign strategic investors  14.6  25.0  59.7  25.3    28.8 
Foreign financial investors  5.3    4.1    29.4  3.8 
Total of foreign investors  19.9  25.0  63.8  25.3  29.4  32.6 
Domestic banks  1.2  –  –  1.5  12.1  0.7 
Domestic insurance compa-
nies  0.1  –  0.0  –  5.4  0.1 
Domestic investment funds  0.1  –  1.4  –  0.9  0.4 
NIFs  0.5  –  –  –    0.2 
Pension funds  0.1  –  –  0.2  0.3  0.1 
Public companies  1.8  –  0.2  3.6  –  0.9 
Subsidiaries  0.4  –  0.9  –  –  0.4 
Other domestic companies 
and cooperatives  4.1  –  –  1.8  0.8  1.8 
Physical persons  10.2  10.0  0.0  62.0    7.9 
The Treasury  11.5  35.1  3.9  –  15.5  16.4 
State-owned companies  0.1  –  2.1  –  –  0.6 
Companies owned by local 
self-governments  0.6  –  0.0  –  –  0.3 
Total of domestic owners  30.9  45.1  8.6  69.1  34.9  29.8 
Total concentrated ownership  
(5 per cent of shares  
in a company or above)  50.8  70.1  72.4  94.5  64.3  62.4 
Dispersed domestic  37.9  19.9  25.9  5.5  35.7  29.4 
Dispersed foreign  11.3  10.0  1.8  –  –  8.2 
Total dispersed ownership  
(shareholders that possess  
less than 5 per cent of shares  
in a company)  49.2  29.9  27.6  5.5  35.7  37.6 
Source: Tamowicz and Dzier¿anowski (2001a).
4 Problems of control vs. ownership have been also studied in other projects, i.e. devoted to 500 largest
enterprises and direct privatisation. However, the method was different: ownership structure was compared
with structure of seats on the supervisory board and the real influence of various groups of owners in the
decision-making process.shares had been issued before the company went public (36 per cent of companies under
review), and control via dependent companies or pyramids.
F. Large private companies
The same team performed a study of 560 large private companies (sales above 70
million zlotys) in non-financial sector, without classifying on privatised and de novo private
firms. The Dun & Bradstreet database for 1999 was used. The research showed that the
ownership  concentration  level  in  this  group  of  companies  was  extremely  high.  On
average, the largest shareholder possessed 68 per cent (78 per cent after excluding the
Treasury and investment funds as largest shareholders). The highest concentration is
linked with foreign investments (average C1 = 97 per cent).
3.2.2. Direct privatisation
A. Employee buy-outs
A number of surveys have been conducted by the team from the Institute of Political
Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences (coordinated by Maria Jarosz in the framework of the
projects ordered by the Ministry of Ownership Transformation, the Ministry of Treasury,
and the State Committee for Scientific Research) (Jarosz 1996). Data from these surveys
have  also  been  used  in  the  above-mentioned  project  on  secondary  privatisation
performed by the CASE team. Not only ownership structure and its evolution have been
studied, but also causes of these changes, interdependencies between ownership and
performance, and structures of power and control.
The surveys show that four main ownership groups have emerged which can be
described along two axes: concentrated versus dispersed ownership, and insider versus
outsider ownership:
– outsiders with small holdings;
– strategic outside investors;
– insider shareholders with large holdings (members of managing and supervisory bodies);
– insiders with small holdings (generally, non-managerial employees).
There  were  two  main  trends  of  ownership  transformation  in  employee-owned
companies:  towards  concentration  of  shares  and  toward  their  “outsiderisation”  (see
Table 4). These processes had different intensity in different groups of companies, and
three patterns of ownership structure have emerged:
– management-employee pattern (large blocks of shares in the hands of managers, the
rest is dispersed among non-managerial employees);
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– ownership concentrated in hands of outside investor.
By the end of nineties, the secondary privatisation processes have been completed in
most employee-leased companies, and now only minor changes can be seen.
A  number  of  factors  which  influence  the  direction  and  dynamics  of  ownership
changes,  among  others  sector  affiliation,  company  size,  initial  ownership  structure,
personal composition of managing bodies, etc., but the most important is the economic
condition, which, when poor, favours concentration and “outsiderisation” of ownership
(as a trade-off between power of insiders and the firm’s existence) (Kozarzewski 1999;
Kozarzewski  and  Woodward  2001).  However,  there  are  path-specific  factors  that
influence processes of initial property distribution and redistribution (see Table 5).
There is strong evidence that, although the ownership structure had been to a great
extent predetermined by the privatisation “path,” as a result of secondary privatisation
processes in many companies ownership structure changed its character from exogenous
to endogenous.
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Table 4. Ownership structure of employee-leased companies (per cent, simple averages)
S Sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er r c ca at te eg go or ry y 
I Im mm me ed di ia at te el ly y 
a af ft te er r  
p pr ri iv va at ti is sa at ti io on n 
1 19 99 97 7  1 19 99 98 8  1 19 99 99 9 
Shareholders:         
Strategic investors (domestic and foreign)  3.3  7.1  9.4  11.0 
Other domestic outside investors:         
private firms  –    0.6  2.1  2.7 
commercialized firms  –    0.4  0.2  0.0 
private banks  –    –    –    –   
state-owned banks  –    –    –    –   
private businessmen  2.5  2.3  2.0  4.5 
others  2.2  6.4  8.5  12.2 
Other foreign investors  –    0.2  0.7  0.6 
Supervisory board members employed in
 the company
a 
11.5  12.0  8.1  6.4 
Executive board members  16.0  18.8  18.9  19.3 
Other managers  13.5  11.9  14.5  11.0 
Non-managerial employees  51.0  40.3  36.2  32.3 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Shareholder groups:         
Strategic outside investor  1.4  9.1  15.2  17.1 
Other outsider investors  6.2  12.3  16.3  22.0 
Managers  33.7  37.6  36.7  29.4 
Non-managerial employees  58.7  41.0  31.8  31.5 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
a Note: Supervisory board members in 1999 are only those who were also employees; prior to 1999, all
supervisory board members were included.
Source: Kozarzewski and Woodward (2001).Comparing to the enterprises that have been privatised through indirect methods,
corporate governance structures in employee-leased companies seem to be to a great
extent  dysfunctional.  Wrong  division  of  powers  and  functions  can  be  seen  in  many
companies, the shape of dysfunction depending mainly on specific ownership structure
pattern.
B. Other “paths” of direct privatisation
In  the  framework  of  the  project  “Direct  Privatisation.  Investors.  Managers.
Employees”  (ordered  by  the  Ministry  of  Treasury,  coordinated  by  Maria  Jarosz),  all
“paths”  of  direct  privatisation  have  been  studied.  Generally,  the  sale  “path”  of
privatisation  favoured  initial  concentrated  ownership  patterns  with  predominance  of
outsiders or managers. The contribution in-kind path led to outsider domination, and the
“fast  track”  modification  of  sale  “path”  did  not  show  any  clear  ownership  pattern.
However, factors which influenced the secondary privatisation processes in those three
groups of companies were similar to those of employee buy-out firms (sector affiliation,
company size, initial ownership structure, and economic condition) (Jarosz 2000).
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Table 5. Chief factors behind perpetuation and change of the initial ownership structure
of employee-leased companies
F Fa ac ct to or rs s  P Pe er rp pe et tu ua at ti io on n  C Ch ha an ng ge e 
Mentality and behaviour 




- structures of power and influence 
- old mentality of insiders 
 
Changes in   
the position  
of various  
insider  
groups 
- fear of outsiders  - property factor: ownership = power 
- reconfiguration of functions and tasks 
- insiders have to adapt to new conditions 
- perception of outsiders as representing an
  opportunity for new investments,  




- employee leasing is insider-dominated 
- corporate partners and foreigners  
  barred from participation in privatisation 
- lower leasing fees (since 1997) 
- faster transfer of title to assets to  
  employee-leased company (since 1997) 
- outsiders should hold at least 20 percent  
  of shares (since 1997) 
- faster transfer of title to assets to employee
- leased company (since 1997) 
Company  
Code 
- companies’ charters can contain  
  restrictions on circulation of shares 
- new organizational structure 
- system of property rights 
- mechanisms of raising capital, share  
  issues and share trading 
Source: Kozarzewski and Woodward (2001).3.2.3. Studies on assets distribution and redistribution
Attempts have been made to look at ownership structure changes in the course of
privatisation as a reallocation of the state property. In 2001, CASE participated in the
project “Restructuring and Growth in Transition Regions and Countries” (coordinated by
Andrew Warner from the Center for International Development at Harvard University)
devoted to the assessment of shifting economic resources to new sectors and industries
during transition. Surveys of enterprises in 13 post-Communist countries, including 151 in
Poland,  have  been  carried  out  (Warner  2002).  The  survey  included  SOEs,  privatised
enterprises and de novo private companies. Managers were asked to assess what percent
of the company’s fixed assets at the time of privatisation (or establishment) and at the time
of  the  poll  had  been  previously  owned  by  a  state-owned  firm  or  the  government.
According to managers’ opinions, in Poland at the time of privatisation, the share of former
state property in the fixed assets of privatised enterprise amounted to 91 per cent, and in
2001 it fell to 61 per cent due to new assets acquisitions from private sector. For de novo
private firms, those figures were 34.3 per cent and 23.1 per cent. Those figures seem to
be highly inaccurate because they are based on managers’ ideas of market value of the
state property in the absence of market on which this value could be verified.5
In  the  framework  of  the  USAID  project  “Sustaining  Growth  through  Reform
Consolidation” (coordinated by Barbara B³aszczyk, CASE Foundation) two regional case
studies of state-owned assets reallocation to private sector have been performed (in
regions of Lower Silesia and Katowice). The research shows, that in the case of SOEs in
good economic condition, privatisation is the most common method of reallocation of
state  property.  In  the  case  in  badly  performing  SOEs,  the  most  common  ways  are
bankruptcy and liquidation procedures. Slow pace of reallocation is caused by incorrect
policy of the state in the field of restructuring of the state-owned enterprises and sectors
which are still mostly state-owned.
4. Conclusions
Polish privatisation and corporate governance legislation is very extensive and covers
all important spheres of ownership transformation, as well as companies’ and capital
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5 The drawbacks of such an oversimplified approach can be clearly seen in the case of Belarus, where,
according to respondents, at the moment of privatisation assets of the state origin constituted a mere 57.3 per
cent of the companies’ fixed assets. This value seems to be absurdly low.market’s functioning. At the same time, the real corporate governance mechanisms are
often inefficient. Minority shareholders abuse is quite common, but at the same time legal
provisions aimed at minority protection are sometimes used for “majority abuse” by
minorities that represent powerful industrial interests. There are also numerous cases of
managers’ opportunism, asset stripping and tunnelling. External corporate governance
mechanisms are often weak and do not always ensure effective regulation of companies’
behaviour. First of all, the weak and shallow capital market must be mentioned.
It seems that there are the following causes of dysfunction in secondary privatisation
and corporate governance spheres:
– Lack of coherent concept of ownership transformation and development of private
property relations. Some very important issues of interrelations between privatisation
and desired corporate governance models and mechanisms are still unresolved.
– Contradictions  in  the  policy  of  the  state  (especially  concerning  securities  market,
external institutional investors, and the role of insiders), clientelism.
– Not fully adequate legislation: at the same time, overregulated, underregulated and
misregulated; lack of integrity which hampers meeting the goals of transformation.
Some provisions of the law have political character and are intended to gain support
of various actors. Sometimes, provisions of law are too general and are not instructive
enough.
– Poor enforcement of the law and other regulations.
Privatisation in Poland is characterised by high diversification of methods and has
mainly  consensual  character.  SOEs  with  different  characteristics  were  designated  to
various methods and paths, which introduced a strong selection bias, exerted a heavy
impact on initial ownership structure of privatised enterprises, and, quite often, on post-
privatisation  processes  as  well.  Therefore  it  is  very  hard  to  analyse  the  problem  of
endogeneity vs. erogeneity of ownership structure vis-à-vis companies’ performance and
other characteristics.
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